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A B S T R A C T
This paper proposes that, diﬀerent though they are, the processes of urban development in China
and the UK can be analytically compared by looking at the commonly occurring opposition and
resistance to that development. Such opposition and resistance can delay and limit the
development of land in and immediately surrounding cities. The paper ﬁrstly reviews literature
on opposition and resistance to development in both the UK and China, before going on to
suggest that this opposition and resistance can in part be explained by a common cause –
resentment at opaque and top-down/centralised planning processes. Consequently, the paper
concludes that a common solution may applicable in both contexts – increasing participation
and building institutional/civic capital amongst communities – and considers the likelihood of
implementing this solution, particularly in China.
1. Introduction
It was widely reported in 2012 that the proportion of the Chinese population living in urban areas surpassed 50%, a rapid
increase since the 1970 s which shows no sign of slowing. In contrast, outside of London, urban populations in the UK are in general
slowly declining through counterurbanisation. This is just one diﬀerence between China and the UK that may suggest that attempts
to compare planning and development processes between the two are futile, and that any thoughts of mutual learning from that
comparison are even more so. One thing which unites the two countries, however, is the process of urban growth, either continuing
conversion of undeveloped, often agricultural, land into housing and other ‘urban’ uses or inner-city redevelopment, and consequent
opposition and resistance to that development – this opposition and resistance is the focus of this paper.
The overall goal and the nature of debate around the topic of urban containment strategies and the compact city in the UK (and
other western countries) and in China can also be considered, at least partially, diﬀerent. While the former seeks to address the
failure of the market in the allocation of land around the edge of cities, and aims at formulating policies to cope with the social and
environmental costs of sprawl, especially in terms of loss of open space, traﬃc congestion, etc.; the latter tends to emphasize the
government's role in fuelling sprawl and also, at the same time, the attempts in recent years to reverse the main trend in the direction
of preserving cultivated land and guaranteeing food security (Zhang, 2000).
The literature in western counties is undoubtedly richer and has explored diﬀerent methods and approaches for managing the
non-urban space surrounding the city at diﬀerent scales (Maruani & Amit-Cohen, 2007). It has also outlined the contradictions of
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those forms of land-use control applied by either central or local government (Pendall, 1999). In China, attention has focussed on the
role played by decentralisation in local government ﬁnance. Whilst this decentralisation has been acknowledged as one of the main
engines of economic development in China, it has also been identiﬁed as the cause of vertical and horizontal governance conﬂicts in
relation to the current strongly land-consuming model. For example, the issue of local public ﬁnance mainly being generated by
revenue from urbanization and not suﬃciently supported by central government (Yanyun Man, 2011); and the related strong
competition among local jurisdictions in complex metropolitan areas that can potentially thwart containment policies set at the
upper level (Zhao, Lu, & De Roo, 2010).
However, returning to our opening argument, by focussing not on the systems or processes of planning, nor necessarily on the
(desired) outcomes thereof, but rather on the unwanted negative consequences which emerge from those systems, processes and
outcomes, we can ﬁnd a common analytical lens with which to understand the complex and dynamic interrelationships which
characterise urban development everywhere. Moreover, a comparative approach and consequent mutual learning can provide an
analytical platform for better understanding about the optimum level of decision-making process in the two countries and under
which conditions it is possible to minimize potential social conﬂicts.
As we will discuss below, in both the UK and China urban growth is a source of contention, leading to varyingly expressed levels
of opposition and resistance. We follow the thread of writing (see for example Smith & Marquez 2000; Bell, Gray, & Haggett, 2005;
Wolsink, 2000) which argues that at least some of this opposition and resistance stems from a sense of powerlessness on the part of
those aﬀected, due in no small part to decision making procedures perceived as being opaque, top-down and clientelist. These
arguments are well established in Western contexts, but as we will discuss below, are increasingly occurring in China as well. For
example, a recent paper by Zhao identiﬁed mayor ‘institutional barriers to capacity-building in urban planning in the transformation
era’ (2015, 280), one of which was a problematic relationship between planning and public participation.
This suggests, therefore, that despite the radically diﬀerent contexts within which planning and urban development takes place in
the UK and China, there is a common problem with a lack of participation in planning leading to opposition to development, and
thus it may be that common principles (if not their detailed operation) can be identiﬁed to help open up decision making to those
who currently feel disenfranchised.
The rest of this paper comprises ﬁve sections – the next considers some explanatory theories in relation to governance, followed
by two brief analyses of opposition and resistance to urban growth in the UK and China respectively, before a comparative discussion
and some concluding thoughts. It is worthwhile at this point to include an explanatory notes.
It is necessary to clarify what we mean by opposition and resistance, and how the two terms diﬀer. The Oxford English Dictionary
suggests that the terms oppose and resist, whilst not synonymous, have similar meanings:
Oppose: To contend, ﬁght, or argue against; to be antagonistic or hostile to; to resist or obstruct (a thing, person, action, etc.).
Resist: To strive against, ﬁght or act in opposition to, oppose; to contrive not to yield to; to withstand, be unaﬀected by the action
or inﬂuence of.
For this paper we interpret opposition to be the less direct of the two, focusing on political/discursive avenues of expression –
opposition to development might, for example, involve arguing against development proposals in various forums, from consultations
carried out by local government to, ultimately, legal battles in court. Resistance to us suggests direct action of some kind, whether
protests in relation to potential development sites or, in particularly newsworthy examples from China, refusing to leave one's home
in the face of redevelopment of the surrounding neighbourhood. There is clearly no solid demarcation between the two terms and
some of the cases we discuss in the rest of the paper feature both discursive opposition and active resistance to urban development –
in others, though, opposition can be facilitated through a political process which appears to encourage open dialogue with a mature
or incipient civil society, but which, in the ﬁnal analysis, cannot necessarily limit urban development – resulting in physical
resistance.
2. Deﬁnitions and theoretical approaches to governance
We follow Jones and Evans in deﬁning ‘governance’ as it relates to ‘government’ – the latter, if deﬁned as a verb, meaning ‘what
the state seeks to achieve’, with its corresponding implication that ‘the state is a singular, monolithic entity speaking with one voice’
(2008, 30–31). Governance, conversely, is ‘the process of delivering the aims of the state’, with increasing involvement of ‘non-state
actors’ to deliver those aims (ibid.). This proliferation of other actors and agencies in the process of delivering the aims of the state
generates, perhaps inevitably, a great deal of complexity and creates new relationships and ways of conceptualising those
relationships. Many books have been written on this subject, so we clearly cannot hope to present a comprehensive review, but we
wish to highlight a small number of contributions which are particularly useful to us, and which we draw upon in the sections which
follow.
A key concept in the context of our focus on top-down planning, and consequently a need for a potential alternative, is that of the
capacity of communities and other groups to get involved in planning – something which is often referred to as institutional
capacity. de Megalhaes, Claudio, Healey & Madanipour (2002, 53) deﬁne institutional capacity as ‘the capacity of urban governance
to make a diﬀerence in sustaining and transforming the qualities of cities’ and they particularly focus on building this ‘in ways which
expand stakeholder involvement and have suﬃcient power to aﬀect the driving forces aﬀecting life chances, economic opportunities
and environmental qualities’. Others refer to this as institutional capital, which itself can be conceptualised as comprising four forms
of capital:
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a) ‘intellectual capital – knowledge resources that are socially constructed and ﬂow among the actors;
b) social capital – relational resources and the nature of relations between the actors;
c) material capital – ﬁnancial and other tangible resources that are made available to the actors and the group; and
d) political capital – power relations and the capacity to mobilise resources and take action’.
Davoudi and Evans (2005, 499).
Social capital is of key interest to us, because ‘individuals or communities with access to social capital… are better able to mitigate
local land-use conﬂicts and better able to manage local change and development’ (Libby & Sharp, 2003, 1194). As Davoudi and
Evans noted, the concept of social capital can be linked to terms such as ‘civic society’, ‘civic virtues’, or ‘civic culture’. The latter was
devised by Almond and Verba (1963, 178), who deﬁned it as ‘a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, perceptions and the like, that support
participation’. Similarly, the former two were coined by Putnam (1993, 15), who deﬁned civic virtues as being deﬁned ‘by an active,
public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, by a social fabric of trust and co-operation’.
Docherty, Goodlad, and Paddison (2001, 2229) tried to pinpoint the diﬀerence between civic culture and social capital:
‘Social capital is usually conceptualised as inhering generally in the relations between citizens, demonstrated in trust, and arising
as a consequence of social interaction, whereas civic culture is a particular form of political culture that is seen as pre-existing, as
well as probably resulting from political experiences and behaviour… Social capital can be seen therefore as a generalised
outcome of culture (including political culture), of social conditions (including political institutions) and of social behaviour that
foster trust in institutions of all types’.
Of course, these various concepts interact with each other:
‘culture aﬀects polity, society and economy; and economy, society and polity aﬀect culture. If a culture supportive of active
participation exists in particular places — a modernised “civic culture”—then it will be easier, we hypothesise, to establish there
the new institutions and practices that foster participation’ (ibid, 2228).
Even where such a civic culture’ exists, it is not always easy for those outside the main loci of power to inﬂuence governance
processes, especially if the state (at whatever level) seeks to ‘frame’ the ways in which such processes operate. Bob Jessop (2003;
2008) described this framing as metagovernance, or ‘governance of governance’ (2008, 8). Metagovernance theory emerges as a
consequence of governance theory itself in democratic countries – as states lose some of the direct control over outputs which they
used to enjoy, given the wider range of organisations involved in delivering those outputs, they look for new ways to control what
transpires without ‘reverting to traditional statist styles of government in terms of bureaucratic rule making and imperative
command’ (Torﬁng, Peters, Pierre & Sørensen, 2012, 122). In planning, metagovernance tactics could be used to ensure that lower
order plans meet certain higher order objectives – for example if a regional plan needed to comply with certain policies set at the
national level. Many would argue this is necessary for states to govern eﬀectively, but metagovernance can have negative eﬀects in
that ‘at diﬀerent levels, actions are constrained by broader framing actions. Ambition at the lowest levels may be frustrated, leaving
individuals and communities feeling powerless, and in the shadow of diﬀerent bureaucratic structures’ (Gallent and Robinson, 2012,
193). Others have described, in a study of governance practices in a particular location, ‘the insidious way that powerful interests
outside and inside a locality can impose their agendas unless there are countervailing grassroots forces to challenge and limit their
operations’ (de Magalhaes et al., 2003, 86).
We will return to these issues in Section 5. In the following two sections we discuss ﬁrst the UK then China, and opposition to
urban development in those two contexts. In the next section we occasionally interchange references to the UK and England. The
detailed operation of planning systems vary between England and the devolved nations (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) of
the UK, but the underlying principles of those systems are the same, so whilst much of the literature we cite refers to England, the
same points, broadly speaking, apply across the UK.
3. Opposition to urban growth in the UK
Opposition to development in the UK can occur in urban, suburban, peri-urban and rural areas. However, for a number of
reasons, this opposition can be at its most intense in areas outside, but in close proximity to, urban centres. One reason for this is
highlighted in the work of Murdoch, Lowe, Ward, and Marsden (2003), in their diﬀerentiation of ‘types’ of countryside, with a key
explanatory factor being the presence of middle class in-migrants, potentially brought into conﬂict with other groups. For our
purposes, the ﬁrst two types of countryside Murdoch et al. identify – the preserved and contested countrysides – are most relevant,
being the closest to urban centres. Table 1 illustrates the diﬀerences between these types of countryside.
This sort of diﬀerentiation does, of course, reﬂect largely subjective analyses of the demographic and associated governance
characteristics of areas, but it does suggest that in areas of the countryside nearer to urban centres we are more likely to see (a)
proposals for urban extensions, new settlements, or indeed any other form of substantial urban-type development; and (b) more
conﬂict around such proposals.
A second reason for higher levels of resistance/opposition to development in these types of area is that it has been argued that the
middle class in-migrants bring with them a substantial amount of the social capital that our discussion above highlights as being
important for participation. Evidence from elsewhere suggests a correlation between aﬄuence and the ability to mobilise opposition
to both unwanted development and the closure of local services (Bondi, 1988; Livingstone, Bailey & Kearns, 2008; Devine-Wright,
2009; Hastings & Matthews, 2015).
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So, in essence, the presence of more aﬄuent incomers in the urban fringe in the UK increases both the likelihood of conﬂict to
development and the chances that opposition/resistance will be successful (Sturzaker, 2010).
Given these factors, it is unsurprising that there is a long history of resistance to urban encroachment into the UK countryside,
with Cliﬀord and Warren (2005) noting opposition to canals and railways in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Cliﬀord and
Warren considered reactions to three development proposals around St Andrews, Scotland, one of which was a housing
development. 68.8% of their survey respondents were opposed to the proposed housing development and 79.4% of respondents
supported the proposal for a green belt around the town. Opposition to the housing development, and support for the green belt, was
expressed principally on environmental grounds.
This support for a green belt is mirrored across the country, given the popular awareness of and support for this method of
limiting urban growth in the UK. Green belts, areas of protected land surrounding the major cities in the UK, are one of the primary
means of eﬀecting urban containment, and on balance are generally agreed to have done so – ‘urban containment through the green
belt can create a much more tightly regulated landscape, thereby reinforcing the division between town and country’ (Gallent,
Bianconi, & Andersson, 2006, 464). At the same time, however, green belts have been blamed for ‘fuelling recent housing
shortages… [because] they prevent sensible and vital extensions to existing settlements, leading to unsustainable development
further away from existing built-up areas, and causing an elevation of property prices’ (Gallent & Shaw 2007, 618). Despite these
criticisms, green belts have attained a somewhat mythical status, and their ongoing protection appears to be considered by all
mainstream political parties as something of a “sacred cow” (HM Government, 2010; The Labour Party, 2010).
Urban containment has been a feature of the British planning system since its conception in 1947 (Hall, Gracey, Drewitt &
Thomas, 1973; Sturzaker, 2010; Cloke, 1979), with many commentators since noting the particular status aﬀorded to the
countryside in the UK, and consequent opposition to development therein (Woods, 2005). It has been suggested that this opposition
to urban growth stems from what has been called the ‘“fetishization” of the rural’ (Gallent & Andersson, 2007, 16), and the
construction/representation of the countryside as a pastoral idyll, ‘a “refuge” from modernity’ (Murdoch et al., 2003, 152).
Current planning policy in England maintains, even outside the green belts, a strong emphasis on protecting rural areas because
of ‘the intrinsic character and beauty of the countryside’ (DCLG, 2012a, 5). This protectionism has been seen as a representation of
the exercise of discursive power on the part of a wealthy, land and property owning middle class (Sturzaker & Shucksmith, 2011),
who set out to exclude ‘otherness’ (Hubbard, 2005).
Linked to these ideas about the perception of the countryside is opposition derived from the (perceived or actual) top-down
nature of the planning process, and the consequent tendency for those opposing development to portray the conﬂict in terms of that
development being ‘imposed’ on those at the local level. So, ‘the fringe is often viewed as the battle-line between town and country,
where the urban encroaches on the rural and where global (economic) pressures come into conﬂict with local development concerns’
(Gallent & Andersson, 2007, 19).
This is not a peculiarly English phenomenon – Woods (2003, 309) notes that, in various countries in the developed world, there
is an increasing politicisation of the rural, and ‘In each case a central motivating force is either the defence of the “rural”…. against
external threat, or conﬂict over the meaning, use and regulation of rural space’.
The case of Ireland interesting in this context – whilst Ireland is clearly a diﬀerent context from the UK, one with a diﬀerent
planning system and where ‘traditionally, within rural areas the planning system has been facilitative of new development’ (Scott,
2012, 94), it has also been argued that the attitudes of planners in the UK have a strong inﬂuence on their Irish counterparts (Scott,
2012). Scott, Russell, and Redmond (2007) explored attitudes to development around Dublin, the capital city of Ireland, where very
rapid urban growth in recent years makes it particularly comparable to much of the UK. This rapidity of growth led to some degree of
conﬂict, much of which emerged due to frustration on the part of communities at their inability to inﬂuence ‘the planning policy and
development plan for the local area’ (Scott, Russell, and Redmond, 2007, 183). In another Irish case, Mahon, Fahy, Cinnéide and
Gallagher, (2009, 65) found that ‘negative experiences of more formal levels of governance – such as outcomes of dealing with the
planning process – may result in local communities and individuals feeling disillusioned and increasingly disconnected from these
institutional frameworks’.
Sturzaker looked at opposition to small-scale housing developments in English villages, ﬁnding a substantial degree of resistance
to such developments. Some of this opposition was expressed in very strong terms, and in some cases led to the abandonment of the
proposed new homes. The reasons for opposition varied – some was labelled as ‘NIMBYism’, or opposition due to self-interest, but
Sturzaker found that some resistance, at least, was due to resentment at top-down planning, with ‘distrust of the local authority’
Table 1
The preserved and contested countrysides in England.
Location Dominant group(s) Dominant attitude(s)
The preserved
countryside
‘much of the lowlands of southern
England, as well as in attractive and
more accessible upland areas’
‘middle-class social groups living in the countryside,
employed primarily in the service sector, and often




‘areas that lie outside the main
commuter zones’
‘local agricultural, commercial and development
interests’ vs. ‘“incomers” who may be middle-class
workers or retirees attracted to the area because of its
residential environment’
‘development for local needs’ vs.
pastoral and preservationist
(adapted from, and quotes from, Murdoch et al. 2003, 12–13).
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(2011, 564) cited as a recurring issue. Others making similar ﬁndings, in the UK and elsewhere, include Bell et al. (2005) in relation
to wind energy developments and Devine-Wright (2009) who argued that ‘place attachment’ led to opposition to external proposals
for change.
Such resentment can trigger a move from political opposition to active resistance to development of diﬀerent forms – witness the
protests in the 1980s and 1990s against various road projects in the UK (Barry, 1999), campaigns against ‘eco-towns’, the proposed
programme of new, energy eﬃcient communities in England in the mid-2000s (Peterkin and Hope, 2008), and more recent
opposition to the closure of libraries (Goulding, 2013). Similar protests have been seen in many other countries, for example in Italy
with the No TAV movement against the high speed rail link between Turin and the French city of Lyon (Roland, 2006).
It is in this context that the UK Government introduced its Localism Act 2011, which aimed to re-shape the planning process in
England. The claim was that the Act started to ‘reverse more than 100 years of centralisation, returning power back to citizens,
communities and local groups to manage their own aﬀairs’ (DCLG, 2012b). A key aspect of the Act was to re-focus the English
planning system by abolishing the regional-level tier and introducing a new community-level tier to the hierarchy of development
plans (neighbourhood plans), on the basis that ‘Regional Strategies built nothing but resentment - we want to build houses. So
instead we will introduce powerful new incentives for local people so they support the construction of new homes in the right places
and receive direct rewards from the proceeds of growth to improve their local area’ (DCLG, 2010).
Early commentary on the new planning system in England raised concerns that the extent to which communities were genuinely
being given responsibility for planning was limited. Gallent and Robinson used Bob Jessop's concept of ‘metagovernance’ (see
Section 2) to critique both the practices of the previous system, and the legislation governing the new one. They concurred with
others (Haughton, Allmendinger, Counsell & Vigar, 2010) that the previous English planning system, including a strong regional
planning tier, could be characterized as a form of metagovernance, but fear that the 2011-onwards system still seeks to achieve
metagovernance through ‘legal compliance between neighbourhood development plans and local plans, with the latter taking
precedence’ (2012, 195). Other concerns about the new system included the potential lack of democratic legitimacy of the process
(Davoudi & Cowie, 2013) and the scope for wealthier/more powerful groups to dominate that process (Hastings and Matthews,
2015; Matthews et al., 2015).
We look at the early evidence regarding the outcomes of these reforms in Section 5, but these criticisms suggest that they do not
necessarily provide a glittering example of best practice that could be immediately adopted elsewhere. They do, though, represent a
stark diﬀerence to the planning system and processes in China, where planning urban growth is characterized by an almost complete
lack of community participation.
4. Opposition to urban growth in China
The scale and rapidity of the Chinese urbanisation process, since the opening of the country to the market in the late 1970s, has
been without precedent in history. This had the merit to leverage millions of people out of poverty in a short timespan ensuring, at
the same time, a relatively orderly expansion of cities (World Bank and DRCSCC, 2014). Urban growth, however, has implied high
costs, especially concerning rising environmental externalities (being pollution the main outcome) and increasing social inequalities.
Urban planning has been often inadequate to tackle these problems, due to the rapid transition from a centrally planned system to a
market system. As a matter of fact, this is case of the City Planning Act of 1989, which has de facto ignored the role of public
participation in planning and has over emphasised land development (Zhao, 2015). Chinese cities have in fact largely favoured urban
expansion to adhere to the national diktat of economic growth, and this has been made possible by local decentralisation and ﬁscal
responsibility. The formation of local growth coalition between local authorities and private developers has been the main engine of
urban development, resulting in a pervert land-driven ﬁscal regime (Wu, 2015). It is the (fair) compensation to peri-urban farmers,
expropriated from their land and relocated in urban areas, that has become during the 1990s and 2000s one of the main source of
tension between aﬀected stakeholders and government.
In addition, this urban growth regime has often resulted in conﬂict with attempts by central government to implement urban
containment strategies and preserve farmlands at the urban fringe through limiting city size, encouraging intensive land
development and designing and implementing green belts in some of the mayor cities of the country such as Beijing (Zhao, 2011).
Due to the relative immaturity of the current land use planning system in China, the urban-rural fringe has become a typical
arena of increasing conﬂicts, being exacerbated by diﬀerences in land ownership of urban and rural land and a diverse status of
citizenship (Verdini, Wang, & Zhang, 2016).
The Land Management Act of 1986 introduced land use plans in order to regulate the conversion of agricultural land into non-
agricultural. Later the National Land Use Plan (1997–2010) set a long-term quota for new development on agricultural land
(CPGPRC, 1997) and the Amendment to the law in 1998 clearly stated the strategic national role of the protection of farmland
through the introduction of a system of monitoring and control of the conversion process and the so-called ‘dynamic equilibrium in
the total amount of cultivated land’ (CPGPRC, 1999).
It has been argued that the combination of the quota system, controlled by the upper administrative levels (provincial and
national), and the fact that the amount of cultivated land allocated for other uses has to be reclaimed from unused land to ensure the
total amount of cultivated land is not reduced, has created diﬃculties in implementation. This attempts to control growth, within a
system which has tolerated a certain laissez-faire at local level, have been very controversial. The governance of farmland conversion
in China, especially if compared with other western countries, has been largely characterized by unclear procedures, very often
resulting in signiﬁcant levels of illegal farmland conversion (Tan, Beckmann, Berg & Qu, 2009). This has primarily generated a
sharp increase in protests, especially in the countryside (Zweig, 2000). The main motive behind the resentment has been normally
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associated with the perception of undercompensated land requisition, emphasised by the use, in some cases, of coercive methods
(Guo, 2001). Loss of land and livelihood, imposed by passive urbanisation, has determined social unrest in China, normally taking
place around the larger cities and emerging in the form of unorganised or spontaneous protests or collective resistance (Wang,
2012).
The process through which China has witnessed increasing tension between central and local levels concerning urban issues has
been framed as China's ‘neoliberal urbanism’, resulting in high level of social resistance as the main externality of development (He
& Wu, 2009). It has mostly aﬀected the urban-rural fringe, as already mentioned and, lately, many inner-city redevelopment areas.
In particular, the latter have become an interesting observatory by which observing not only social tensions but also insurgent and
more structured opposing voices against projects perceived as unwanted as in the case of the downtown urban regeneration of
Nanjing, Shanghai and Suzhou (Verdini, 2015)
Recalling the theoretical framework we have introduced, the type of protest expressed by peri-urban farmers can be addressed ‘as
‘resistance’, with the peculiarity of never challenging the political system as such but rather invoking rules or policies perceived as
being violated by local oﬃcials (Bernstein, 2004). It is instead from the experience of more mature urban systems that is possible to
observe the constituency of forms of oppositions, in some cases successful.
Nevertheless, a step has been taken to ensure a more eﬀective legal protection for collective land ownership and individual land
use rights in rural areas, and to limit the discretional rural-urban conversion, providing a fairer compensation for the loss of
agricultural land (CPGPRC, 2007). While this reform can surely be acknowledged as a step forward in achieving more social stability,
other diﬀerent but related issues cannot be underestimated in understanding how urban growth features in China. We refer to the
emergence of illegal behaviours and ‘opportunistic’ attitudes where growth is limited by upper planning levels.
In this respect it is worth mentioning some important attempts made to implement shape-related tools for planning urban
containment, such as green belts. While the overall fortune of green belts in Asia has been quite limited, if compared to the UK, some
cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing and Shenyang have introduce a green belt in their local planning tools. Yang
and Jinxing (2007), have studied the development of the Beijing one describing its pros and cons. Since its conception in 1983, the
Beijing green belt has gone through diﬀerent phases of implementation, encountering several problems. The mechanism of
implementation was based on a monetary compensation for the relocation of farmers, plus an annual payment if the farmers choose
to maintain the land as undeveloped. They are allowed to sell their land to a developer who can allocate only one-third of the land for
real estate development, with the rest to be preserved as green space. The farmer can eventually get a house from the new
development. A survey of land use in 1998 revealed ‘the land use in the green belt was dominated by the built-up area at 49.1%,
followed by agricultural land at 25.6%. Greenspace only accounted for 15.8% of the total area’ (Yang & Jinxing, 2007, 290). ‘Not
surprisingly, even though only one-third of the land could be legally developed into real estate, farmers and developers often
collaborated to develop more than that quote’ while the government ‘turned a blind eye to the illegal development in the greenbelt’
getting beneﬁts from the taxes generated (ibid, 294). Pragmatically, the Beijing municipal government, in order to give a strong input
to the conclusion of the green belt programme, launched a vocal campaign for the production of a new green space, scaled down the
size of the ﬁrst belt, and adding a second belt.
The evidence from Beijing suggests that part of the problem results from the fact that the rural villages had no say in the decision
making process. Local farmers (almost 880,000!) were excluded from any form of involvement, ultimately taking the ‘opportunistic’
advantage of making the most from the deprivation of their land. ‘Illegal’ behaviour, i.e. the change in use of land, and/or
development on land which is not in accordance with oﬃcial rules and regulations, is embedded in one of the most controversial and
long-term problems of modern China – namely the issue of the ownership of land and the acknowledgment of property rights in
rural areas (Ho, 2001). We argue that it is partly due to lack of ‘civic culture’, limiting the possibility of building institutional capacity
and eventually making participation work.
On the other hand, in recent years and particularly around urban growth tensions located in inner city areas, an incipient civil
society has attempted to systematically oppose local government appetites for growth (Verdini, 2015). Due to the historical value of
some areas, grassroots movements and groups of local elites have jointly expressed purposive actions to change the status quo,
advocating for pro-conservation strategies. These have arisen in response to top-down impositions and developed from the bottom.
It has not been always eﬀective, with the risk of emerging illegal behaviours like in the case of the south part of the historic city centre
of Nanjing (Zhang, 2012), drawing an interesting parallel with what is happening at the fringe, but it has meant a signiﬁcant progress
in local governance functioning.
In general terms the governance structure for urban growth management in China is gradually becoming more comprehensive
and mature, both in terms of planning instruments employed and of the protection of land rights, but nevertheless the Chinese
model is still considered strongly land consuming, mainly based on command-control planning instruments and conﬂictive in its
nature (Pieke, 2002; Feizhou & Bourguignon, 2009).
In fact, the Chinese system, despite some eﬃcacious action taken at central level, has created and still creates opposition and
resistance to urban growth. The source of contention and the consequent sense of powerlessness can be ascribed to both the
perception of an unfair compensation for land expropriation, and the feeling of abuse of power and corruption exerted by local
cadres. Very often the two tend to overlap, making it hard to distinguish between them and legitimating illegality as a form of ‘self-
compensation’. The result is that the attribution of responsibility is diﬃcult to determine, lying in the so called ‘deliberate
institutional ambiguity’ of the ownership of land, where several intermediate actors can potentially take economic advantage of land
being transformed (Ho, 2001).
In particular, the second issue, (perception of) corruption, has to do with the particular form of the decision-making process,
especially at the local level, and current practices or local habits, perceived as featuring collusion with city oﬃcials.
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However, recent studies shows that the ﬁscal reform of the early 2000 s has reduced local government appetite for growth,
recentralising ﬁscal authority to the county level. This fact, together with the previous introduction of village-level elections, has
unintentionally generated new alliances between local cadres and citizens, creating a new generation of village leaders,
disenfranchised from previous privileges and more willing to represent the voice of their people (Wang, 2012). This is the case of
a recent case of local participation in the Jiangsu Province, where civic engagement tools have been tested with the support of local
oﬃcials, in order to gain the maximum consensus over a development proposal for a rural village (Verdini et al., 2016).
Summing up, in China the main reason for opposition derives from the thwarted aspirations of the main stakeholders involved,
namely the displaced farmers relocated to new urban development in comparison to the discretional beneﬁts of the few. It might be
argued that the compensation, either monetary or in the form of housing, can improve their overall living condition, but very often
the sense of deprivation of land, capabilities and rights that will impact on this group is underestimated, especially for some selected
and more passive categories (Wu, Webster, He & Liu, 2010). Moreover the widespread mistrust of the state and local oﬃcials,
deeply embedded in Chinese culture, can produce opportunistic attitudes among individuals that might limit the success of whatever
process of involvement in the decision making process. On the other hand, Chinese cities are also witnessing the consolidation of an
incipient civil society, which goes hand by hand with the growth of the middle class and the expansion of wealth (The Economist,
2016). These sectors of the societies are more inclined to counterbalance the system of power by raising their voice and claiming for
their rights. It is hard to say whether this can eﬀectively nurture the ‘civic virtues’, so precious in the functioning of institutions and
eventually produce an eﬀective change of the status quo. However, this emerging trend in China can be observed with the lens of
Western experiences, to see whether some of those could be applicable in China in the near future and under which conditions.
5. A comparative discussion and analysis
The preceding analysis has shown that, despite the many and obvious diﬀerences between their contexts in terms of population,
rate of development, governance structures, etc., the UK and China share a common feature of (sometimes intense) opposition and
resistance to urban development. We have suggested to take into account primarily the UK experience in relation to urban growth,
where resistance and opposition tend to overlap; and to distinguish between rural resistance and urban opposition in China,
although even here distinctions between the two tend to disappear. This is in large part due to the greater levels of social and cultural
capital in, respectively, the UK urban fringe and Chinese inner cities (though, particularly in China, this is a developing area which
requires further research). Bearing this in mind, does opposition and resistance in the two countries share a common cause?
The planning system in the UK, and indeed other ostensibly ‘developed’ countries has been criticised for adopting a ‘decide-
announce-defend’ method, with decision-makers consulting aﬀected communities and individuals on eﬀectively a fait accompli –
this in itself has been blamed for the levels of opposition often seen to new housing developments (Bell et al., 2005). The Chinese
situation cannot be certainly described as being any more democratic than the English – in fact, we might say the Chinese planning
system could be described more as a ‘decide-announce-ignore’ approach. This coercive attitude of the government, however, faces an
increasingly structured organisation of protest, sometimes led by popular leaders able to mobilize people through their social
networks. This can produce eﬀective and active resistance, any repression of which can be highly costly in both ﬁnancial and social
terms (Li & O’Brien, 2008).
China has undergone a strong decentralisation process in recent decades that has made possible the revitalisation of the urban
economy, fuelled by a vivid dynamism at local level. The central government has encouraged urbanisation, generating local
governance conﬂicts which require resolution in what are often unclear planning procedures. At the same time local government fails
to consider the conﬂict inherent in decision making at the local level – namely those which have to passively accept top-down
decisions.
In the attempt to reverse this trend, the need for improving the Chinese system of participation has been quietly acknowledged in
oﬃcial documents (MLRPRC, 2005) and some emerging participatory practices have arisen.
This brief discussion regarding UK and China suggests that top-down, or centralised, planning is a major contributor to
resistance and opposition. So what tools might be available to support a move towards bottom-up planning, particularly in the
challenging Chinese context? To answer this question a comparative table between UK and Chinese participatory practices is here
introduced. The intention is to highlight whether there is scope in China to experiment with some of the most common practices of
participation already tested in the UK and at which stage of development they are (see Table 2). The second column of this table
refers to the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2), which has developed a “Public Participation Spectrum” (IAP2,
2014), developing the work of Arnstein (1969) and others. This spectrum places participation activity on this scale: Inform-Consult-
Involve-Collaborate-Empower, and is helpful in capturing the extent to which (in our opinion or the opinion of others) participation
in decision-making has a meaningful impact on the decision eventually reached.
The table illustrates that there are certain prerequisites, or conditions, for participation activities to be successful. These may be
institutional, such as what Docherty et al. (2001: 2245) called ‘opportunity structures’, or Healey (2006) called ‘hard infrastructure’.
But they may equally be cultural – the same paper noted the need for a “civic culture”. Can China possibly be said to embody such a
culture? Perhaps not, as Docherty et al. (2001) identify that ‘A civic culture and high levels of trust are associated with features of
advanced economies and their populations such as high levels of education and of associational activity’ (2229). However, we need
not necessarily despair, because Docherty et al. looked found that ‘a possibility that citizen participation may be fostered as much by
the creation of opportunity structures that build conﬁdence in the eﬃcacy of participation as by the intrinsic levels of civic culture’
(ibid, 2246) – so providing the opportunity to participate can help support the development of the culture needed to do so.
So, in contexts where civic culture is lacking, it may still be possible to build structures and processes which facilitate bottom-up
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governance. Within the planning arena, one way of doing this could be to move towards what has been described as ‘collaborative
planning’, a process through which participants ‘come together, build understanding and trust among themselves, and develop
ownership of the strategy’ (Healey, 2006, 249).
However, scholars have in recent years pointed to a trend in China of ‘individualization of collective problems’ (Ren, 2013, 135),
in part because self-organised collectives such as trade unions are illegal in the country – Ren argues that ‘the oﬃcial unions are de
facto government agencies and do not really represent workers’ interests’ (ibid.). This individualisation makes resolving labour
conﬂicts diﬃcult, and similarly could mitigate against collaborative planning-type arrangements. In part this is because
individualism is perceived as a reaction against the old social order and a form of emancipation in the new contemporary China,
as has been discussed in relation to female factory workers in Guandong province (Chang, 2009).
Even in countries with ostensibly a longer history of collective action, collaborative planning has been criticised for its ‘idealism
and utopianism’ (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998, 1988) and a study of devolution in planning inspired by collaborative
planning found that ‘these initiatives have not achieved any substantial change in the attitude of vested interests including public
authorities’ (Åström et al., 2011, 575). The 2011-onwards reforms to the planning system in England under the label of ‘localism’
have, according to their progenitors (The Conservative Party, 2010), some connections with the principles of collaborative planning
– if nothing else, they are designed to be ‘bottom-up’, not ‘top-down’ in nature. Studies of the new neighbourhood plans in England
are as yet relatively few, but the published work that has emerged has identiﬁed both positive and negative aspects. Some work
(Wills, 2016) has suggested that neighbourhood plans have emancipatory potential, changing the balance of power between
municipalities and communities. Others have identiﬁed the potential for diﬀerent models of development, perhaps smaller-scale and
better meeting community needs, to be promoted by neighbourhood planning groups (Bradley and Sparling, 2016). Conversely,
others have noted that there is evidence of Jessop's ‘metagovernance’, through the framing of community action by ‘higher-tier’
authorities which consequently limits what neighbourhoods can do (Sturzaker & Shaw, 2015; Parker, Lynn, & Wargent 2015). So it
seems fair to say that the type of approach advocated by Healey and others is far from fully implemented in the English context, and
is some distance away in contemporary China.
In fact a review of some community participation experiences across China reveals how economic rights are still prioritised over
social and human rights and how the institutional environment, labelled as quasi-democratic, appears either unfamiliar with
participatory procedures, or in some cases imposes or manipulates them with the aim of achieving greater legitimation (Plummer &
Taylor, 2004). Conversely there have been some tentative experiments with deliberative democracy in China (Fishkin et al., 2009),
but it seems that wider political reforms would be needed for such practices to become more widespread. Nevertheless, evidence that
some are using these sorts of approaches, although perhaps just at an initial stage (see Table 2), can only be a positive for those of us
who seek to democratise the planning process.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented evidence of resistance and opposition to urban growth in England and China. We have noted that
in England political/discursive opposition is common – indeed, is facilitated by the structure of the planning system in that country.
Active resistance to development is rarer, but tends to occur when opponents to development feel they have exhausted such non-
direct interventions. In contrast, in China, physical resistance is more common, in large part due to the radically diﬀerent political
and social context wherein discursive opposition to ‘the state’ is strongly discouraged or literally unviable due to social
fragmentation. Notwithstanding this diﬀerent context we have used the occurrence of opposition/resistance to development as a
case study to illustrate a common ﬂaw in the planning systems in both countries, and proposed that a move away from top-down
planning to a more participatory form of governance may help ameliorate this resistance. We have noted that there another
commonality between the UK and China is that much opposition/resistance occurs in locations where civic capital is stronger – in
areas of the countryside immediately surrounding cities in the UK, home to many middle-class in-migrants; and in inner-city areas
in China, where there has been a longer recent history of an active civil society. It might be argued therefore that in other parts of
both countries there is insuﬃcient social or civic capital to facilitate a move to more participatory planning. We have discussed the
potential for new structures of governance to be developed even without the existence of such capital, which can in turn help to build
that capital. As a matter of fact, the introduction of village-level elections accompanied by ﬁscal reform in China sheds a light on how
trust and cooperation (alliances) can rise in place of hostility. In this concluding section we ﬁnally discuss possible challenges to
greater democratisation in planning.
A common objection to introducing bottom-up planning might be that such an approach cannot guarantee that the state can
meet its strategic objectives. This may be a risk, but it is also the case that ‘proposals which genuinely derive from a community-
based plan or a broad based community drive for development appear to stand more chance of receiving the support of that
community’ (Sturzaker, 2011, 567; and to a certain extent: Yung, Chan & Xu, 2014), so unless the aims of the state are such that
community support appears unfeasible, more community involvement may actually help deliver those aims and reduce the need for
top-down enforcement. Or, as Libby and Sharp (2003, 1198) put it, ‘landowner participation in a well-designed planning process
may help avoid reliance on mandatory measures to control land use’ – that, in the case of China, might mean relying on costly
repressive methods against illegality, given the large scale of the phenomenon.
Following analysis by Wainwright (2009) of examples of diﬀerent degrees of bottom-up governance in the West, certain key
themes emerge as warnings, or perhaps lessons, for the development of new or amended governance structures.
The ﬁrst is that whilst moving the responsibility for planning from the (central) state to non-state actors such as neighbourhoods,
as the Localism Act 2011 has done in England, potentially increases their representativeness, to ensure that community-run services
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are not subject to nepotism, etc., ‘It is not enough to democratize the state but social institutions outside the state must also
democratize themselves’ (Wainwright, 2009, 144). This implies a great degree of responsibility on these institutions to police
themselves. It is too early to say whether this responsibility will be met by the new neighbourhood planning agencies, but the
discussion in the preceding section implies the need for the cultivation of something akin to civic capital if this is to be the case – and
of course a willingness on the part of individuals to act together as part of a ‘community’.
Secondly, it might be that local agencies are ‘committed to community leadership, but centrally held government purse strings
decree “outcome” targets which are insensitive to the messy, chaotic phases that democratic processes often go through’
(Wainwright, 2009, 242). This quote related to Manchester in England, but this dissonance between central targets and local
aspirations is not uncommon. A related example can be found in China, where the decentralisation of ﬁnance to local authorities has
led to them seeking to expand their urban areas, in conﬂict with urban containment strategies.
Thirdly, beyond that kind of dissonance is the more profound problem of limits to local power. Wainwright saw, in that same case
study of Manchester, ‘residents grasping for themselves some power… Sometimes, though, they come up against national or city-
wide constraints over which they are powerless – as if participation should know its “local” place’ (2009, 250). This is perhaps a
universal problem for such activities, with England's Minister for Planning recently stating that ‘Localism does not mean local
authorities doing what the hell they like’ (Marrs & Millar, 2012). A number of authors (for example Haughton et al. 2010 in relation
to the UK) have questioned whether the decentralisation rhetoric adopted by governments across the world has been matched by
action, with a tendency for politicians to be unwilling to cede power when they attain it. It is a warning to avoid the naïve belief that
more formal participation in China could be necessarily beneﬁcial, just assuming the West as the horizon for action.
Of course, powerful interests seeking to limit bottom-up democracy exist even outside of the public sphere. This is because
‘powerful interests outside and inside a locality can impose their agendas unless there are countervailing grassroots forces to
challenge and limit their operations’, as pointed out by de Magalhaes et al. in discussing an initiative of ‘deliberative governance’ in
Newcastle (2003, 86). This quote illustrates the obvious point that well-meaning outsiders cannot create situations in which
participatory democracy can ﬂourish – citizens themselves must demand the right to run their own aﬀairs. But conversely it appears
to be the case that, as discussed above (Docherty et al., 2001), more eﬀective structures of participation in themselves encourage
more citizen involvement. This may be the area in which academics and other ‘outsiders’ can best involve themselves, whether in the
Chinese context or elsewhere – to disseminate best practice, and perhaps challenge existing power structures to consider whether
they could do things diﬀerently.
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